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TIME SHARING PERFORMANCE OF EGOCENTRIC AND ALLOCENTRIC FRAMES OF 
REFERENCE AS AN INDICATOR OF RESOURCE POOL 
 
 
The Multiple Resource Model (MRM) sets forth groups of cognitive resources and is 
used to predict dual task interference. Recent updates to the model suggest that it may not be all 
encompassing. The current studies aim to determine the resource use of egocentric and 
allocentric frames of reference (FoR) within the criteria of the MRM.  
Egocentric and allocentric FoR have been widely studied for their use in navigation aids, 
especially in aviation, and a plethora of neurological research has attempted to determine the 
neural correlates of each FoR. These two bodies of literature support the first two criteria of 
being considered separate resources, but the time sharing capabilities (the last criterion) have not 
been investigated. The current research used a dual task paradigm under intermediate and heavy 
resource use to determine how these FoR can be time shared. Results between experiments 
conflicted but indicated a stronger tendency toward improved performance under conditions in 
which the FoR being used for both tasks was the same. This was unexpected and does not fit into 
the MRM. Improved performance may be a result of task similarity, which can improve 
performance according to the shared processing routines hypothesis. Implications for navigation 
aid design are discussed.  
   
 
 iii 




ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
EXPERIMENT ONE .................................................................................................................... 18 
EXPERIMENT TWO ................................................................................................................... 28 
GENERAL DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................... 36 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 45 
 
  







 Time sharing is done often by people in everyday life. From events as mundane as 
driving a car and listening to a podcast, or feeding your baby and talking with your spouse, to 
more specialized tasks such as pilots communicating with air traffic control while flying their 
plane, or soldiers driving a Humvee while reading bomb detecting radars; time sharing is 
everywhere. The advantages and disadvantages of this phenomenon, also colloquially referred to 
as multi-tasking, have always been apparent in some respects. While there are some individual 
differences, we can typically time share activities like driving a car and listening to an audiobook 
with reasonable efficiency, but we cannot effectively drive a car and read a book. The theory 
behind why multi-tasking or efficient time sharing is possible, and how to use these abilities 
advantageously, has proven very helpful in the design of dual task environments. 
Multiple Resource Theory 
 Early Attention Theories. During the 1950s, fixed capacity theories of attention surfaced 
as the search for a “human capacity limit” became a focus of psychological research. These 
theories quickly faded due to an inability to account for skill acquisition (Sanders, 1997), but 
over the years other theories came to light, generally suggesting a variation of a single resource 
model or general pool of resources (Kahneman, 1973; Sanders, 1997). These models supported 
the idea of a limited but sharable capacity and have been termed “resource models.” However, 
the idea of a single resource did not account for all of the differences in dual-task performances 
and the associated decrements. Research began to provide evidence that differences in demands 
of information processing structures led to differences in time sharing efficiency (i.e. Kantowitz 
& Knight, 1976). This understanding of processing structures as resources, along with research 
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that laid out the intersection of multiplicity and resource necessity in economics (Navon & 
Gopher, 1979), led Wickens (1980) to conduct a meta-analysis of attention studies and propose 
the Multiple Resource Model, which is now widely adopted and used in the design of multi-
modal displays (Sarter, 2007). 
The Multiple Resource Model 
 
The Multiple Resource Model (MRM) proposes that humans have separate “resources” 
used for information processing (Wickens, 2002). The first of these, stages of processing, posits 
that perceptual and cognitive tasks use different resources than selecting and executing actions. 
Codes of processing accounts for the way that spatial activities use different resources from 
verbal activities. The final dichotomy, modalities, accounts for the fact that auditory perception 
is a different resource from visual perception.  
 These dichotomies were derived based on three criteria. First, a resource is considered 
separate if it uses different neural structures from the other resource under consideration. For 
instance, in the codes of processing dichotomy, neural systems supporting sentence 
comprehension (verbal task) have been shown to be distinctive from those used in mental 
rotation (spatial task). Sentence comprehension generally activates areas in the left superolateral 
temporal cortex, whereas mental rotation mainly activates areas in the parietal regions (Just et 
al., 2000).  
The second criterion is efficient time sharing. If two tasks are equal in difficulty, they 
should be able to be performed concurrently better with separate resources than if they used the 
same resource. Though, this does not imply a complete lack of decrement in performance. For 
example, time-sharing efficiency is improved between tactile and visual/auditory modalities as 
compared to tactile/tactile time-sharing. Tactile resources are a recent addition to MRT, and their 
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time sharing abilities are directly supported by a study in which participants performed dual tasks 
as tactile-tactile, tactile-visual and tactile-audio (Scerra & Brill, 2012). Performance was worst 
on tactile-tactile dual tasks, providing evidence that tactile resources can time share better with 
other modalities. 
The third criterion is less theoretical and more applied: the difference in resources should 
have a tangible impact on design implications (see Sarter, 2007, for review). For instance, 
Brickman, Hettinger and Haas (2000) proposed a new cockpit design for pilots to help moderate 
the workload they experienced from the current cluttered display. They utilized visual, auditory 
and tactile options to present pilots with information in ways that aided concurrent processing, as 
each of these options relies on a different resource. This allowed pilots to allocate previously 
used resources to other tasks, which may help increase safety. Changes like those in the cockpit 
have also been seen in car displays. Many cars now have a visual display for navigation, music 
choices, and other pertinent items. However, this display competes for the visual resource, which 
is always being used to keep the car in the lane. When these displays are equipped with an audio 
tool that can speak the information, such as naming available songs out loud, time sharing is 
improved and therefore the decrement to driving performance is lessened (Jeon et al, 2015). All 
of these studies provide evidence for the different resources under the MRM model. One of the 
main reasons the MRM has been so widely accepted is its applicability in such a wide spread of 
environments and tasks. 
Critiques and Acceptance of Multiple Resource Model 
 
 One critique of MRM is its lack of architecture - that the MRM does not actually define 
what a resource is, it just predicts the outcomes of using different modalities or codes (Sanders, 
1997). The MRM does define a resource as having separate neural components, which provides a 
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certain physiological level of evidence. Arguably, this is not very different from defining 
resource capacity as based on the ability to introduce a second task, as it does not define the 
concept in a hard and fast way (i.e. “a resource is a specific pattern of neural firings”). It may be 
that cognitive “resources” are somewhat of a metaphor, similar to attention as a “spotlight” (see 
Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 2002, for a review of attention metaphors). In more recent years, 
some neuroscience studies have suggested that resources can be operationally defined based on 
neural oxygen consumption or activation of brain areas (Just et al., 2001). Together, this 
evidence suggests that this critique is not as relevant as it may have been when it was first 
introduced. 
Another main critique is the lack of decisiveness in where resources stop being divided 
(Sanders, 1997; Hancock et al., 2007). Already, vision has been divided into two categories, 
focal and ambient, and the tactile resource has been added to the modalities. At what point does 
it become too complicated to be useful? While the human mind is complex and therefore models 
of the mind are also likely to be complex, it is important that the MRM be beneficial to the 
design of technologies and dual task scenarios, which can be difficult if it becomes overly 
complicated. This is not expected to be a problem though, as overflow of the model is not likely, 
and the criteria needed for two entities to be considered separate resources are strict. 
Additionally, growth of the model is not a problem in and of itself, as long as the applications of 
its predictions are still clear.  
 The MRM has been widely accepted, especially in the Human Factors world of 
psychology and in the design of multimodal displays, for a few reasons. First, single resource 
theories of attention (e.g. Kahneman, 1973; Sanders, 1997), do not account for time sharing in 
the same way that the MRM does. While a single resource suggests that performance is limited 
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by capacity or efficiency, which can vary on other dimensions such as arousal, it does not 
account for the differences in time sharing across modalities or codes when the tasks are equally 
difficult. The inability of these single resource theories to provide an explanation for those 
differences has rendered them less useful in applications. Conversely, the MRM provides direct 
applications to design of dual task technologies or products (see Sarter, 2007, for review). For 
example, displays involving visual and auditory modalities have helped anesthesiologists 
monitor a patient while conducting another task (Crawford et al., 2002) and multi-modal 
proximity warning devices in cars have been shown to improve response time to stopped 
vehicles (Kramer et al., 2007). Although the existence of theories for continued basic research is 
important, the natural next steps to cognitive resource identification are applications specifically 
for improving human performance. The smooth transition from the MRM into applications 
provides an incentive for designers and researchers to use the model. 
The wide acceptance of the MRM should inherently support more research on the topic. 
By conducting more research, a deeper understanding of and more applications for the MRM can 
be developed. This can also bolster the theory, reveal falsifying evidence, and improve the 
design of technologies – all of which can help progress science. Therefore, the current research 
aims to build upon the MRM and examine its application to frames of reference. 
Updates to the MRM 
 
In 2002, the MRM was updated to include a nested dichotomy within the visual modality 
of processing (Wickens, 2002). Named visual channels, this differentiates the resources of focal 
and ambient vision. Focal vision is primarily used for object recognition in a small, direct field of 
view, whereas ambient vision involves the entire visual field and is used for perception of 
movement and orientation. This explains why people are able to keep their car in the center of 
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the lane using their peripheral vision while glancing in the rearview mirror with their focal 
vision. The dichotomy was presented in one form by Previc (1998) in a model of how we view 
the 3-D world around us. He asserted that the focal realm is a small area in front of the person 
and predominantly activates the ventral cortical visual pathways of the brain, whereas the 
ambient realm covers about 180 degrees of the front visual field and predominantly activates the 
dorsal cortical visual pathways of the brain. This supports the first of the requirements (different 
neural structures) for separate resources.  
The second requirement, time sharing, has support from a handful of studies (i.e. 
Lenneman & Backs, 2018; Tsang & Chan, 2018). Specifically, Allen et al (1969) found that 
performance was worse on dual tracking tasks when peripheral vision could not be used, which 
suggests that focal and peripheral vision can be time shared.  
The third requirement, implications for designers, currently has a large focus in 
improving design of automation in cars. One way to do this is to use ambient light for navigation 
by placing lights on the steering wheel that indicate the direction of an upcoming turn, rather 
than requiring focal vision to focus on a screen with directions. The design applications of 
ambient light were investigated in a 2016 study. It was found that ambient light resulted in the 
lowest frequency and duration of glances, and was rated as most acceptable and least cognitively 
demanding by participants (Matviienko et al., 2016). While there are certainly other applications, 
it is already clear that the dichotomy of focal and ambient vision does define separate resources 
under the MRM. The addition of the visual channels can be used as a recent precedent for new 
resource dichotomies.  
A Parallel Dichotomy. The addition of ambient and focal visual channels may have a 
parallel in frames of reference. It has been suggested that humans use two frames of reference in 
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everyday life – egocentric and allocentric (Klatzky, 1997). An egocentric frame of reference is 
when locations are represented with respect to the perspective of the observer – for instance, 
recognizing that your friend is sitting to the right of you. Egocentric frames of reference are often 
used in driving for carrying out objectives such as determining how far away a turn is or how 
close you are to the car in front of you. Conversely, using an allocentric frame of reference (also 
referred to as exocentric, geocentric or world-reference view), processes locations in relation to 
an external framework. This is often used when providing cardinal directions, such as “head 
north,” or in situations such as air traffic controllers locating planes on the radar screen, where 
the entire relevant airspace is represented on the screen in a fixed orientation and the planes are 
shown as small icons in their relative positions. 
 While it is clear these frames of reference encode information differently, it is not clear if 
they use the same or separate resources within a multiple resources framework. They do meet 
two of the three criteria for being considered separate resources – different neural components 
and design implications, which are detailed below – but the time-sharing component has not yet 
been studied. It seems the two frames of reference are interconnected, but to what depth is 
currently ambiguous. Understanding the separation of the two frames of reference would be 
beneficial for applications such as navigation design, as well as contributing to the MRM and 
providing more insight into the cognitive mechanisms involved. 
Criteria for Separate Resources 
Neuroscience. Research on the neural correlates of egocentric and allocentric frames of 
reference have some general consensus, but also a lot of uncertainty surrounding them. Overall, 
the literature seems to point towards a frontoparietal network of activation for egocentric tasks 
and hippocampal activation for allocentric tasks. These conclusions are not unanimously agreed 
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upon and there is contradicting literature; however, most studies have found different neural 
correlates when comparing the two frames of reference.  
Egocentric Frame of Reference. Galati and colleagues (2000) were some of the first to 
investigate the neural correlates of frames of reference through fMRI. Participants in their study 
decided if a vertical line that intersected a horizontal line was to the left or right of a body-based 
(egocentric) midpoint or a screen-based (allocentric) midpoint. They found activation in the 
frontoparietal network with extensive activation in the right hemisphere on the egocentric trials. 
In a similar study, Ruotolo and colleagues (2019) found the same results, with most activation in 
the frontal and parietal regions of the brain. These results have been supported in a number of 
other studies (i.e., Zaehle et al., 2006; Gramman et al., 2006), including a brain lesion study 
showing that patients with lesions in the right parietal lobe exhibited spatial neglect and/or 
deficits in representing the location of objects and people in relation to themselves (Vogeley & 
Fink, 2003). Together, these studies provide strong evidence to support the claim of 
frontoparietal network activation in egocentric tasks. 
Allocentric Frame of Reference. The hippocampus appears to be the main neural area 
activated for tasks requiring an allocentric frame of reference. Burgess and colleagues (2002) 
conducted a review of the literature supporting cognitive map theory, which states that the 
hippocampus represents locations and contexts of environments. They found an abundance of 
results that suggest the hippocampus is involved in complex navigation and specifically, the right 
hippocampus is involved in general allocentric object location and navigation. More recently, 
Ekstrom, Arnold and Iaria (2014) provided a critical review of the literature surrounding the 
hippocampus as an allocentric neural correlate. They cited studies of rats with lesions to the 
hippocampus that were unable to complete the Morris Water Maze task, an allocentric based 
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navigation task regarding an underwater platform and external landmarks. They also referenced 
studies that found the human hippocampus to be active in allocentric but not egocentric tasks, as 
well as findings supporting the parahippocampal cortex being involved in navigation. Both 
reviews also referred to studies that showed impairment in allocentric spatial navigation abilities 
of people with lesions to the parahippocampal cortex but not the hippocampus, and vice versa, 
indicating the importance of both areas to allocentric spatial abilities. 
Transformations Between Egocentric and Allocentric Frames of Reference. The main 
brain area found to be activated in transforming spatial information between egocentric and 
allocentric FoR is the retrosplenial cortex (RSC). Clark and colleagues (2018) found 
considerable overlap in active neurons in the RSC for coding egocentric and allocentric spatial 
scenes. They theorize that the RSC is more specialized for allocentric coding, but does play a 
role in both. It has also been found in rodent brains that the RSC has place cells that guide 
flexible spatial behavior and, in rodents, is the site for transformations (Wang et al., 2020). 
Additionally, in both primates and humans, the RSC has been shown to have connective patterns 
with medial temporal lobe structures, supporting the theory that the RSC plays a crucial role in 
the translation between frames of reference (Boccia, et al., 2017). While transformations between 
the frames of reference are not a part of the criteria for being considered separate resources, it 
does indicate that the two are related and may need to be taken into consideration when 
determining how they interact in time sharing formats. 
Disagreement in the Literature. While there is a general consensus that the neural 
correlates for each FoR are separate, there is still some disagreement across the literature. Lesion 
studies have shown that egocentric and allocentric neglect can occur simultaneously, suggesting 
that some parts of the brain may be responsible for both FoR (Galati et al, 2000). The studied 
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lesions are not always in the same brain area, further complicating attempts to understand the 
neural correlates. Studies have also found significant overlap in the activation areas between 
frames of reference, especially in circumstances where egocentric tasks have activated the 
hippocampus or activated a subset of allocentric activations (Zaehle et al, 2006; Wang et al., 
2010). The uncertainty in the literature could be due to methodology differences (see Ekstrom et 
al., [2014] for a discussion of methodology) and therefore may be difficult to discern through 
neuroscience studies alone.  
It is also possible that rather than the underlying frame of reference, differences in the 
nature of egocentric and allocentric judgements might cause variations in the neurological 
correlates. Kosslyn et al. (1989) proposed two distinct forms of spatial relations: categorical 
(such as up/down/left/right) and coordinate (distance-based). These can occur in both egocentric 
and allocentric tasks, but if the type of judgment across the frame of reference taps different 
spatial relations, then different areas of the brain will be activated for reasons other than 
differences in the frame of reference. For example, judging the distance between two objects 
might employ coordinate spatial relations in an allocentric frame of reference (“the mouse is six 
inches from the keyboard”), whereas judging the relative location of an object to yourself might 
employ categorical spatial relations in an egocentric frame of reference (“the mouse is to my 
right”). Leaving aside whether differences in spatial relations might rely upon additional separate 
pools of resources, it is critical not to confound the two dimensions of relations and frame. Thus, 
properly assessing the influence of frames of reference requires matching the type of spatial 
relations judgments across conditions.  
Additionally, egocentric and allocentric judgements are not completely dichotomous, but 
fall along more of a continuum. Consider a “tethered” viewpoint, where the display screen shows 
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a view as if a camera was behind and above the person at a 45-degree angle (see Wickens, 
Vincow & Yeh, 2005 for pictorial representations). While this is technically an allocentric point 
of view, the user still sees the external world in relation to themselves (i.e. “right” on the screen 
is to their actual right), which presents an egocentric component. This type of view was not used 
in the neuroscience literature reviewed here, but it is another example of why the categorization 
of frames of reference may be complex both in neurological and cognitive science. 
In sum, if two tasks using different frames of reference can clearly be effectively time 
shared, it may suggest that they are different resources and therefore have different neural 
correlates. If they cannot be time shared, it may be that the overlap and inconsistencies seen in 
neuroscience studies is due to the nature of frames of reference and not methodological 
differences. Based on the current literature, it is likely that egocentric and allocentric frames of 
reference activate different neural structures, suggesting that they do meet the neurological-based 
criteria for being considered different resources. The behavioral research conducted in this 
experiment will hopefully provide more insight. If the frames of reference are able to be 
effectively time shared, this would provide more support for the activation of different neural 
structures and may point to the differences in tasks and methodologies as a potential reason for 
the larger discrepancies in neural correlates.  
Applications. Another requirement for consideration of multiple resources is applications 
to design. Applications of frames of reference have been extensively studied in navigation, 
especially aviation and driving, producing an overall unanimity for the best use of each frame of 
reference. An egocentric frame of reference is best for navigation tasks that require local 
guidance (Olmos et al., 2000) and an allocentric frame of reference is best for global spatial or 
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situational awareness (Wickens & Prevett, 1995). Much of the reasoning for these conclusions 
stems from the inherent benefits and drawbacks of each frame of reference. 
Egocentric Viewpoints. A fully egocentric viewpoint is essentially identical to the 
viewpoint of our eyes (Wickens et al., 2005). Even within this constraint, there are various ways 
to design egocentric displays. From our actual bodily viewpoint, we can turn our heads to see 
outside our straightforward line of vision, which some displays mimic through specific degrees 
of view that can be rotated. Displays can also keep specific degrees of view without rotation, or 
they can be slightly askew from the straightforward field of view (i.e. as if from the top of the 
person’s head).  
An egocentric FoR has three main advantages: (1) It is a natural view so there are no 
transformations necessary to maintain the user’s current viewpoint, which helps keep cognitive 
workload steady; (2) Targets ahead of the user are viewed with depth perception so their 
movement is easier to perceive, as is the ability to interact with or avoid them; (3) The location 
of targets or objects in relation to the user is as they appear in the display (i.e. an object on the 
left of the screen is to the user’s left). These advantages are most beneficial in navigation or 
tracking tasks (Wickens & Prevett, 1995; Wickens et al., 2005). An egocentric frame of 
reference also can reduce cognitive workload in navigation tasks because it reduces the mental 
rotation necessary to determine where a person is or is going (Aretz & Wickens, 1992). When 
creating navigation aids, track-up maps use the egocentric viewpoint. A track-up map will follow 
the navigator, turning to face the same direction they do; meaning north will change direction on 
the display in relation to the user’s point of view. Track-up maps have been shown to be useful 
for target navigation tasks, distance estimation, and overall accuracy and speed in navigation 
(Wickens et al., 2005; Wen, et al., 2013; Rodes & Gugerty, 2012). They are beneficial for quick 
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and accurate target navigation, whether it be needing to drive to an unfamiliar place or locate a 
target such as a hurt comrade in a military scenario. 
 However, egocentric frames of reference also have large drawbacks. Most importantly, 
they tend to have a “keyhole cost,” which results when dynamic information outside the current 
field of view is not seen (Wickens, 2003). Even when a display can be rotated, it does not 
guarantee that the change will be seen or processed (change blindness). Part of the reason a 
change may go unnoticed is because when panning, the viewpoints must be held in working 
memory and then integrated, which can create a heavy cognitive workload (Wickens et al., 
2005). This may not be performed well when other tasks are using mental resources, which is 
often the case when navigating. These costs are also seen in track-up maps, as their 
representation of the environment is unstable and changing so the user often lacks strong 
situation awareness and doesn’t learn functional knowledge of the environment that could be 
used if there was no navigation aid available. 
Allocentric Viewpoints. An allocentric viewpoint represents targets or locations based on 
an external framework (Klatzky, 1997). Often, this framework is based around cardinal 
directions or other targets, such as when one says “the grocery store is north of the home 
improvement store.” Allocentric viewpoints fall along a continuum. A display may be static, 
such that the borders of the display do not move and the same area is always represented, or it 
may be more dynamic, where the area within the display changes based around a specified 
parameter, such as a radar screen used by air traffic control. An environment also may be 
represented from an above, “God-like” point of view, or somewhere closer to egocentric, such as 
behind and slightly above the user, where they can still see the representation of their location. 
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 The biggest benefit from an allocentric frame of reference is support of situation 
awareness (Wickens et al., 2005; Endsley, 1995). Because an allocentric frame of reference 
allows most of or the entire environment to be seen at once, keeping slices of it in working 
memory and combining them to create a mental picture is not necessary. The user is less likely to 
miss a change in the environment and can scan far larger areas than from an egocentric point of 
view. On the other hand, allocentric frames of reference are less likely to benefit performance on 
tasks that require direct navigation, distance estimations or bearing identification (Klatzky, 
1997).  
North-up maps are inherently allocentric, which makes them also associated with the 
benefits and drawbacks of an allocentric point of view. A north-up map is stable, with north 
always at the top of the frame, making it so that locations can easily be seen in relation to each 
other, but not so easily in relation to the user’s current point of view. The stability of these maps 
encourage spatial awareness and functional navigation information. They are useful when trying 
to learn a new environment (Taylor et al., 2008). However, these allocentric maps tend to require 
higher cognitive workload during navigation because of the necessary mental rotation and 
transformation to align your current view with the map. They also tend to show decreased 
accuracy in navigation and longer reaction times for responses to location queries in comparison 
to track-up maps (Williams et al., 1996). This can be an issue if the user needs to arrive 
somewhere without errors, such as military personnel reaching a safe landing zone.   
Time Sharing. In some situations, there is a clear benefit to using a north-up or track-up 
map, or a different form of an egocentric or allocentric viewpoint. Finding the correct exit on an 
unfamiliar highway lends itself to a track-up map or egocentric viewpoint to assist in distance 
estimation and reduce the cognitive workload. Moving to a new city and learning the layout of 
   
 
 15 
the town can benefit from an allocentric or north-up map because it allows high interest locations 
to be mentally mapped out in relation to other locations, which is useful when the starting point 
of travel changes (i.e. going to store B from store A, rather than from home to store A). 
However, there are situations in which the consideration of these factors is not so clear-cut, and 
concurrent access to both points of view would be useful.  
 Imagine you are a soldier in a warzone with a hurt comrade to rescue, unreliable service 
for your navigation system, and your life on the line. It’s important to get to the victim quickly 
and accurately, as a wrong turn could put you face to face with an enemy, but it’s also important 
to gain a functional knowledge of the area in case your navigation system loses service. In this 
case, a north-up, egocentric map would help with accuracy and target location, but a track-up, 
allocentric map would be most helpful in learning the environment. It can be difficult to combine 
the two maps in a functional way, but moreover, not much is known about the ability of time-
sharing and concurrent processing between the two frames of reference. It is unclear if 
egocentric and allocentric resources are separate or overlapping, which would help determine 
timesharing abilities. However, situations in which this parallel processing is necessary do arise, 
often in military and aviation settings.  
 In conclusion, determining the allocations of resources could have major implications for 
the design of navigation systems. Previous research has generated theories surrounding each 
frame of reference in their applications, advantages and disadvantages, and neurological 
correlates, all of which indicate support of different resources. However, without understanding 
the timesharing abilities of frames of reference, their resource dependency distinction cannot be 
defined under the MRM. In the neuroscience literature, it seems that the retrosplenial cortex is 
responsible for transforming spatial information between egocentric and allocentric frames of 
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reference, which suggests the two can work together. Explicitly determining time sharing 
abilities will help define them as being supported by separate or the same resource(s). While this 
will fill a theoretical gap in the literature, it also has larger implications in applications for use 
and design.  
 The current experiments used a dual task paradigm to determine how multitasking 
performance for various pairs of frames of reference conditions compare to each other and to 
control tasks. The tasks were drawn from the existing neuroscience literature (Galati et al., 2000; 
Zaehle et al., 2006). Line judgements were provided in an egocentric (EL) or allocentric (AL) 
version. The secondary task was audio stimuli, asking about the spatial relationships of shapes in 
egocentric (EA) or allocentric (AA) terms. Combining these four options provided four trial 
types for participants, EL-EA, EL-AA, AL-EA, and AL-AA. For a control condition, line 
judgements were made on color (CL) rather than based on the egocentric or allocentric frame, 
producing two more categories: CL-EA and CL-AA. Making color judgements is intended to be 
associated with neither egocentric nor allocentric frames of reference because color 
discrimination is not a spatial task. This condition is considered to provide a neutral assessment 
of the overall cognitive demands of the auditory task. Based on current literature, it was 
hypothesized that: 
1. Performance on incongruent (egocentric-allocentric) line-audio tasks will be better 
compared to congruent (egocentric-egocentric or allocentric-allocentric) line-audio tasks 
because there will be less resource competition. 
2. Performance on dual tasks involving color judgements will be better than those involving 
the same frame of reference judgements because there is no spatial resource involved in 
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color judgements, compared to the competition for the spatial resource in the dual frame 
of reference trials. 
3. Performance on dual tasks involving color judgement will be similar in performance to 
those involving different frame of reference judgements because both types of tasks 
involve different resources and therefore time sharing will not be worse in one condition 
than the other. 
 
  








Participants. 54 Colorado State University Psychology students participated in the online 
study for partial course credit. All self-reported not being colorblind. A priori power analyses 
were conducted based on an effect size of 0.2 at alpha .05. The correlation between the 
secondary tasks was unknown, but based on limited pilot data, the number of correct responses 
in each category appeared very similar. With a strong correlation of r=.7, the power calculation 
suggested 42 participants would be necessary; with a correlation between measurements of the 
secondary task of r=.5, a sample of 66 participants would be necessary. Therefore, a sample size 
54 participants was expected to provide enough power to detect a small effect with a medium to 
high correlation between audio responses, while allowing for some fluctuation in the correlation 
of the measures. 
Task. Participants viewed 11 second videos during which six lines appeared on the screen 
for 1.5 seconds each. The lines were a medium shade of green, intersected by a short vertical line 
in differing shades of green (Figure 1). Horizontal lines appeared across the middle of the screen 
with variability in the x-axis locations, and the vertical lines could intersect the horizontal line at 
10 different intervals. Before each video played, participants were told to count the number of 
times the vertical line appeared in a specific spot or hue. For egocentric tasks, participants 
counted the number of vertical lines that were to the right or left of the center of their body, 
regardless of color or location in relation to the horizontal line. For allocentric tasks, participants 
counted the number of vertical lines that intersected the horizontal line to the right or left of the 
horizontal line’s center, regardless of color or location in respect to their bodies. Importantly, 
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both of these judgments demand the use of categorical spatial relations, varying only the frame 
of reference. For control tasks, participants counted how many times the vertical line was lighter 
or darker than the horizontal line, regardless of position. 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the shades of vertical lines and four possible locations of the vertical line.  
 
Concurrent with the line task, a secondary task was implemented in which participants 
listened to an auditory cue describing the position of three shapes and then answered a question 
based on the information. Egocentric audio cues described the shapes in relation to the 
participant’s body (i.e. “the circle is to your right”). Allocentric audio cues described the shapes 
in relation to each other through cardinal directions (i.e. “the circle is north of the square). 
Together, these tasks created six categories: egocentric congruent, allocentric congruent, 
egocentric incongruent, allocentric incongruent, control egocentric, and control allocentric. 
Congruent trials meant the line and audio tasks were the same frame of reference, whereas 
incongruent trials had different frames of reference for each task.  
Procedure. Data was collected online through Qualtrics, therefore participants used a 
personal device with an ability to press buttons on screen, listen to sounds, and respond with key 
presses. After consenting, they were asked to put their browser into full screen mode and 
presented with instructions to center their computer screen with their body, aided by a graphic. 
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Then, they listened to an audio cue to adjust their volume as needed and saw Figure 1 with 
explanations of lighter and darker lines with a chance to adjust their computer brightness if 
needed. They experienced three practice trials where they determined the position and hue of the 
line as a single task. Participants received instructions detailing the types of audio cues they 
would hear and practiced with one egocentric and one allocentric cue. Once participants 
practiced the single tasks, they experienced two practice trials that were exactly like the 
experimental trials; one was the egocentric incongruent condition, and the other was the control 
condition with egocentric audio. Correct answers were required before the experimental trials 
could start. After the experimental trials, participants were debriefed and given course credit.  
Experimental Design. The study measured accuracy of line and audio tasks across three 
types of lines (egocentric, allocentric, color) and two types of audio (egocentric, allocentric; see 
Table 1). Each trial type was tested ten times and blocked together. The blocks contained five 
trials of each sub-type (i.e., counting the vertical bar to the right or to the left, or lighter or 
darker). The blocks and trial sub-types were presented in a random order to each participant. 
Participants were offered an optional break between blocks. No feedback was provided on 
responses except on the practice trials. 
 













 Average accuracy across all trials, combined for the line and audio tasks, was 65%, 
suggesting a difficult but not impossible task. Performance was highest on the incongruent trials 
at 66% accuracy for both line-audio combinations. Accuracy was not much lower on congruent 
trials at 65% for egocentric and 61% for allocentric.  
 Importantly, overall accuracy, averaged over the lines and the auditory task, for the 
congruent tasks was 63%, as compared to 66% for incongruent tasks. This was marginally 
significant (t(53) = 1.97, p = .05, d = 0.21), but may suggest, consistent with the first hypothesis, 
that frames of reference are different resources under the MRM. 55% of participants increased 
their accuracy in the incongruent condition from the congruent condition. On line accuracy 
alone, 66% of participants increased their accuracy in the incongruent condition, and 88% of 
participants increased their audio accuracy in the incongruent condition. These patterns indicate 
that the differences are not driven by a few outliers. Accuracy averages for all trial types are 
listed in Table 2. 
 




Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 65% 66% 66% 
Allocentric 66% 61% 64% 
Color 67% 68% 67% 
Mean 66% 65% 66% 
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Audio Accuracy.  To better understand the marginal overall significance between trial 
types, a 2 (line type) by 2 (audio type) repeated measures ANOVA was run on the accuracy of 
audio trials, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 3. There was a main effect of line type (F(1,53) = 
5.59, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.09), where allocentric line tasks made the audio task harder than the 
egocentric line tasks did. There was no main effect of audio type (F(1,53) = 0.43, p = .51, ηp2 = 
.01). The interaction marginally failed to reach significance (F(1,53) = 3.50, p = .06, ηp2 = .06), 
which again may suggest that using different frames of reference improves performance on the 
audio task.  
 
Table 3. Accuracies for audio tasks for trials across all conditions. 
Lines 
Audio 
Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 69% 75% 72% 
Allocentric 66% 63% 65% 
Average 68% 69% 68% 
    
 
Planned comparisons looking first at the egocentric audio task indicated there was a 
marginal difference between congruent trials (69%) and incongruent trials (66%; t(53) =-1.81, p 
= .07, d = 0.22), suggesting that performance of the egocentric audio task may be superior when 
coupled with the egocentric line task than when the egocentric audio task was combined with the 
allocentric line task. For the allocentric audio task, there was a sizable difference between 
congruent trials (63%) and incongruent trials (75%; t(53) = -2.82, p = .006, d = 0.48), suggesting 
that pairing the allocentric audio task with the egocentric line task was better than pairing it with 
the allocentric line task. All results stand when the alpha level is adjusted through a Bonferroni 
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correction to .025 for the multiple comparisons. While the latter of these comparisons supports 
the hypothesis that tasks using different frames of reference can be time shared better than tasks 
using the same frame of reference, the first comparison does not support that hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 2. Accuracy on audio questions based on line-audio combinations. Error bars represent 
one standard error.  
 
 Line Accuracy. A 2 (line type) by 2 (audio type) repeated measures ANOVA was run on 
the accuracy of line trials as shown in Figure 3 and Table 4. There was no main effect of line 
type (F(1,53) = 2.95 p = .09, ηp2 = 0.04). There was a main effect of audio type (F(1,53) = 7.67, p 
= .007, η2 =  0.12), where allocentric audio made the line task more difficult than egocentric 
audio. The interaction was not significant (F(1,53) = 1.05, p = .30, ηp2 = .04).  
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Table 4. Average accuracies for line tasks across all trial types. 
Lines 
Audio 
Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 61% 57% 59% 
Allocentric 66% 59% 63% 




Figure 3. Accuracy on line questions based on line-audio combinations. Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
Planned comparisons showed no difference on the egocentric line task between congruent 
audio trials (61%) and incongruent audio trials (57%; t(53) = -1.31, p = .19, d = 0.19) but there 
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was a difference for the allocentric line task between congruent trials (59%) and incongruent 
trials (66%; t(53) = -2.76, p = .007, d = 0.41). This indicates that the allocentric line task was 
performed better when combined with the egocentric audio task than with the allocentric audio 
task. The results of the planned comparisons stand when a Bonferroni correction is applied and a 
new alpha level of .025 is used. As in the above audio accuracy results, the line task performance 
offers some support for the hypothesis that using difference frames of reference improves 
performance.  
Cost and Benefit Comparisons. The control condition was then used for comparisons to 
determine the costs and benefits of congruent and incongruent frames of reference. For all 
comparisons, the application of a Bonferroni correction and new alpha level of .0125 does not 
change the statistical significance of the findings. For egocentric audio tasks, there was no 
difference between the control condition (62%) and incongruent condition (66%; t(53) = -0.95, p 
= .34, d = 0.16); and no difference between the control condition and the congruent condition 
(69%; t(53) = -1.49, p = .13, d = 0.24). These findings are consistent with those above in 
showing that the line task paired with the egocentric audio task does not influence performance. 
 For allocentric audio tasks, there was not a significant difference between the control 
(62%) and congruent condition (63%; t(53) = -0.23, p = .81, d = 0.04), but there was a significant 
difference between the control and incongruent condition (75%; t(53) = -3.58, p < .001, d = 
0.61). Enhanced performance in the incongruent condition compared to the control condition 
suggests that there is a benefit in using two different frames of reference. It also indicates that the 
differences are not due to a cost of trying to use the same frame of reference resource for two 
tasks, nor from some type of interference with the task properties, because the combination of 
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allocentric audio with allocentric line task is no worse than the combination of allocentric audio 
with the control line task.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 examined three main hypotheses. First, it was hypothesized that 
performance on incongruent tasks would be better than on congruent tasks, which was 
marginally supported. Based on the theory that separate resources better support time sharing as 
compared to the same resource, the higher accuracy and improved performance by 55% of 
participants on incongruent tasks suggests that these two frames of reference may be different 
resources. However, using the 55% as an effect size under the percent correct classifications 
(Grice et al., 2020), and a p-value of .05, there is only slight evidence in favor of the two frames 
of reference. Additionally, only the interaction of line and audio frame of reference on audio 
accuracy was near significance, while the interaction on line accuracy was not. Thus, it is 
difficult to draw concrete conclusions, and this is further examined in Experiment 2. 
 The second hypothesis, that performance on the control trials would be better than those 
involving the same frame of reference, was disconfirmed. Overall accuracy in the control 
condition was only 2% more accurate than the congruent trials, which has no statistical or 
practical significance. For audio performance, the control condition was no different than any of 
the congruent conditions. This is somewhat surprising, given the findings supporting different 
frames of reference. Discriminating the color of a visually presented line demands verbal 
resources (as seen in the Stroop task), rather than spatial resources. This means that fewer of the 
same resources are employed for a frame of reference and color dual task scenario than would be 
the case for the congruent FoR task. Performance here, compared to that of the congruent trials 
was expected to be better because drawing from different resources better supports time sharing. 
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The marginal significance of the first hypothesis and very small effect size coupled with this 
finding may suggest that all FoR judgments tap one resource. It is important to note that the 
difficulty of the color task in comparison to the FoR tasks may not have been the same, which 
could also be a factor in these results. 
 The final hypothesis, that performance on control trials would be similar to the 
incongruent trials, was confirmed for overall accuracy. This may support the first hypothesis, as 
the similarity in performance may suggest that both types of trials use separate resources. 
However, accuracy on the control tasks was significantly worse than the egocentric incongruent 
condition, which does not support this hypothesis. Coupling these findings with the results that 
control and congruent trials are not significantly different complicates the conclusions that can 
be drawn about resource use. It seems that generally, different frames of reference are better 
under dual task conditions, but importantly, these results do not systematically align with any 
prediction the MRM would have made, which will be returned to in the General Discussion. 
 
  







In Experiment 1, the difference in performance on congruent and incongruent trials was 
only marginally significant, with only a significant interaction for audio accuracy. One reason 
the difference in performance was low could be that the cognitive resources involved were not at 
maximum use. Although overall accuracy was not particularly high, the tasks were difficult and 
near perfect performance was not expected. When cognitive resources are not at their maximum 
load, it is likely that people are better able to multitask, regardless of resource congruency (e.g., 
Collet et al., 2010). The current study aimed to increase the difficulty of each trial by increasing 
the cognitive load on participants to amplify the interactions seen in Experiment 1. The number 
of lines was increased and the time they were viewed was shortened. It was hypothesized that the 
overall accuracy would be lower here than in Experiment 1 due to the increase in difficulty and 
resource use. Additionally, performance on the control trials was again expected to be better than 
congruent trials and similar to incongruent trials. Lastly, it was expected that performance would 
be significantly worse on congruent trials than incongruent.  
Methods 
Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1 except for the following:  
1. 50 undergraduates participated for partial credit. 
2. Each video now contained 11 lines rather than 6, making the lines visible for half a 
second each (rather than 1.5 seconds each). The first six lines were the same as those in 
Experiment 1, the last five were new. The audio task remained the same.  
 
Results 
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 Validating the intent to increase task demands, average accuracy across all trials was 
58%, which is significantly lower than in Experiment 1 (t(103) = 2.88, p < .005, d = 0.56). 
Performance was highest on the allocentric congruent and allocentric-line incongruent trials at 
59%, but was not much lower on the egocentric congruent trials at 57%. Accuracy was lowest on 
the egocentric-line incongruent trials at 48%.  
 Importantly, accuracy for the congruent tasks was 56%, as compared to 52% for 
incongruent tasks. This is a significant difference (t(49) = 2.89, p = .005, d = 0.29), however, this 
does not support the hypothesis that egocentric and allocentric frames of reference are different 
resources because the improved performance was on congruent tasks, rather than incongruent. Of 
people whose score differed between the two conditions, 66% had lower scores in the 
incongruent versus the congruent condition, suggesting these results are not simply due to a few 
participants with large differences across conditions. 
 
Table 5. Overall accuracies of all audio-line frame of reference task combinations. 
Lines 
Audio 
Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 58% 48% 53% 
Allocentric 60% 61% 61% 
Color 64% 62% 63% 
Mean 61% 57% 59% 
 
 
 Audio Accuracy. A 2 (line type) by 2 (audio type) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on audio accuracy as shown in Figure 4. There was a main effect of line type (F(1,49) 
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= 13.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .21), where egocentric lines made the audio task harder than allocentric 
lines. There was no main effect of audio (F(1,49) = 0.40, p = .53, ηp2 = .01), but there was a 
significant interaction (F(1,49) = 4.78, p = .03, ηp2 =0.08), likely driven by the low accuracy 
(57%) on the incongruent condition for the allocentric audio task.  
 
Table 6. Accuracy of audio tasks across all conditions 
Lines 
Audio 
Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 64% 57% 61% 
Allocentric 65% 69% 67% 
Average 65% 63% 64% 
 
In follow up planned comparisons, for the egocentric audio task there was no significant 
difference between congruent (64%) and incongruent (65%) conditions (t(49) = -0.33, p = .74, d 
= 0.05). For the allocentric audio task, there was a significant difference between the congruent 
condition (69%) and the incongruent condition (57%; t(49) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 0.65), with this 
large effect showing better performance when allocentric audio was coupled with the allocentric 
line task than when combined with the egocentric line task. This is again not predicted by the 
MRM because the congruent conditions that should tap more of the same resource pool had 
significantly higher accuracy. 




Figure 4. Accuracy of audio questions by line-audio combination. Error bars represent one 
standard error.  
 
 Line Accuracy. A 2 (line type) by 2 (audio type) repeated measures ANOVA was then 
conducted on line accuracy. There was a main effect of line (F(1,49) = 4.60, p = .03, ηp2 = .08), 
where egocentric lines were harder than allocentric. There was also a main effect of audio 
(F(1,49) = 6.46, p = .01, ηp2 = .11), where the line task was harder when the audio task was 
allocentric rather than egocentric. There was a marginally significant interaction (F(1,49) = 3.32, 
p = .07, ηp2 = .06) that likely reflects the very low accuracy (39%) in the egocentric line 
incongruent condition.   
Planned comparisons showed a significant difference in the egocentric congruent trials 
(52%) compared to the incongruent trials (39%; t(49) = -3.10, p = .003, d = 0.43). Although the 
difference is large, the improvement is on the congruent trials, which is inconsistent with the 
predictions from the MRM. There was not a difference between allocentric congruent (52%) and 
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incongruent trials (54%; t(49) = -0.52, p = .60, d = 0.07). For all comparisons, the application of 
a Bonferroni correction and new alpha level of .0125 does not change the statistical significance 
of the findings. 
 
Table 7. Accuracies of line tasks across conditions. 
Lines 
Audio 
Egocentric Allocentric Average 
Egocentric 52% 39% 46% 
Allocentric 54% 52% 53% 
Average 53% 46% 49% 
 
 
Figure 5. Accuracy of line tasks by line-audio combination. Error bars represent one standard 
error.  
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 Cost and Benefit Comparisons. Control trials were used for comparisons to determine 
the costs and benefits of the same and different resource use. Once again, Bonferroni corrections 
were not applied as statistical significance would not be impacted by a lower alpha. There was a 
significant difference in audio accuracy for allocentric congruent trials (68%) and allocentric 
control trials (60%; t(49) = -3.46, p = .001, d = 0.44). However, the control allocentric trials were 
not significantly more accurate than the incongruent trials (65%; t(49) = 0.95, p = .34, d = 0.16), 
which was true for 70% of participants. This suggests there is a benefit to sticking with the same 
frame of reference. For egocentric audio trials, there were no differences between control (69%) 
and incongruent (65%; t(49) = 1.49, p = .14, d = 0.24) or control and congruent (64%; t(49) = 
1.60, p = .11, d = 0.30), suggesting that secondary task combination for egocentric tasks does not 
matter. This could potentially support the MRM, but may not reach significance due to a lack of 
power.   
Comparing Experiments 1 and 2. Accuracy in Experiment 2 was lower than Experiment 
1 (t(103) = 2.88, p < .005, d = 0.56), as expected. The main difference between the two 
experiments was the trends in performance between congruent and incongruent trials. 
Experiment 1 showed slight support for improved performance on incongruent trials overall and 
for audio accuracy, but Experiment 2 showed stronger support for improved performance on 
congruent trials. For line tasks, however, Experiment 1 indicated incongruency is better for 
allocentric tasks, but Experiment 2 indicated congruency is better for allocentric tasks. Looking 
only at audio tasks, both experiments suggested that the pairing of a secondary task with an 
egocentric frame of reference does not matter. For allocentric audio tasks, Experiment 1 
suggested incongruency is better but not because of a cost in congruency, whereas Experiment 2 
suggested that congruency is better because there is an actual benefit. These are very 
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contradictory results that arise from the changes in difficulty across experiments. This is 
discussed further in the General Discussion. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was intended to increase the load on cognitive resources to further test the 
interference between FoR. The decrease in overall accuracy suggested that cognitive resources 
were stressed more and confirmed the first hypothesis that performance would be worse than in 
Experiment 1. Performance was no different for overall accuracy in the control conditions than 
in either congruent or incongruent conditions, which disconfirms the second hypothesis. This 
was also true for egocentric audio accuracy. However, when looking at allocentric audio trials, 
the control condition was significantly worse than the congruent condition, which may suggest 
there is a benefit to using the same resource in a dual task environment when load is high.  
Most notably, there was better performance under congruent conditions compared to 
incongruent conditions, which disconfirmed the second part of the second hypothesis and is not 
predicted under the Multiple Resource Model. The reason for these results is not immediately 
clear, although it may be a result of task switching costs or shared processing routines, rather 
than resource interference. Previous research has shown that when two tasks are governed by the 
same rules, concurrent processing can be better supported (e.g. Duncan, 1979; Fracker & 
Wickens, 1989; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). That is likely the case here, however, there is no 
obvious basis to predict this change in the outcomes would occur in Experiment 2 compared to 
Experiment 1, where identical tasks were presented at a slower rate. There are a few pieces of 
evidence that support the similarity based cooperation account: Similar performance in the 
control and incongruent conditions indicates that the change of rules between tasks makes it 
more difficult than when using the same rules (as seen in the congruent conditions) and it is not 
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simply different resources being used in the control condition as the congruent condition; a slight 
(but not significant) improvement in the congruent condition over the control condition again 
indicates it may be that the rule similarity improves performance; and significantly better 
performance in the allocentric congruent condition than the allocentric control condition all 
support task similarity as an explanation for these results.  
 
  







 The current experiments were designed to test cognitive resource interference between 
egocentric and allocentric frames of reference. Stimuli from neuroscience frame of reference 
research were adjusted and used to create a dual-task paradigm to assess capabilities of 
egocentric and allocentric time sharing. Experiment 1 assessed time sharing capabilities under a 
lower cognitive load, and Experiment 2 aimed to increase the resource use associated with both 
tasks to further assess time sharing abilities. 
 Very little replicated across experiments. The primary effect that did replicate was that 
the frame of reference for the line task, when paired with an egocentric audio task, did not 
change performance on either task. This is an interesting effect because it does not align with any 
prediction of the Multiple Resource Model (MRM) or the hypotheses. This could be because 
egocentric audio tasks were easier than allocentric audio tasks, as the former trended towards 
higher accuracy than the latter. The egocentric audio tasks may have been easy enough to not 
warrant heavy dual task interference. 
Multiple Resource Model Framework 
 Frames of reference already appear to meet two of the three criteria necessary to be 
considered separate resources (neural correlates and applications to design). It was hypothesized 
that they would meet the time-sharing criteria and thus be considered separate resources. 
Experiment 1 suggested this might be true with marginally higher accuracy on trials involving an 
egocentric-allocentric combination (incongruent) as compared to those using the same frame of 
reference (congruent), but Experiment 2 suggested the opposite. 60% of participants in 
Experiment 2 had improved performance on the congruent trials compared to the incongruent 
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trials, which provides evidence that the difference was not due to any outliers but instead was a 
consistent pattern. This was not only unexpected, but also directly contradicts any prediction of 
the MRM. If the frames of reference were the same resource, results would have shown no major 
difference in performance between incongruent and congruent trials. Yet, the results indicating 
improved performance on the congruent trials under higher workload were much stronger than 
those indicating separate resources. 
The marginal support in Experiment 1 for improved performance on incongruent tasks 
may be a result of the lower difficulty of the trials. Lines appeared on the screen for a second and 
a half, which provided an ample amount of time for participants to recognize the line, make a 
decision, and refocus their attention to the audio cue. The lower level of difficulty may have 
allowed participants to time share the two tasks without any major decrement to performance, 
regardless of frame of reference use or task type. However, when the lines were present for only 
half a second in Experiment 2, the difficulty and cognitive resource use were increased. While it 
was hypothesized that this would amplify the interaction of line and audio task type, instead, it 
created unpredicted results. 
 One possibility for the unexpected improvement in performance is that under higher 
workload, frames of reference are subject to similarity based cooperation. Although it has been 
shown that task similarity can induce confusion between tasks or elements due to an increase in 
interference - for instance, attempting to count while someone else is also counting out loud, 
sometimes task similarity can be beneficial. When the rules that govern two tasks are similar, it 
can improve concurrent processing (Fracker & Wickens, 1989). Specifically, when considering 
the fast pace of Experiment 2, the need to switch between the mental rules of “is this line to my 
left/right?” and “is the shape to the north/south/ east/west?” is much more difficult than 
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considering all shapes and lines in the same way. For this reason, it may be that the results of 
Experiment 2 are explained by the shared processing routines hypothesis, which states that more 
similar rules between two tasks increases the ability of them to be performed simultaneously, and 
such similarity dominates when more rapid switching is required (Duncan, 1979).  
In a slightly more recent study, Rogers and Monsell (1995) found that when one target 
and one “irrelevant” (supposed to be ignored) visual stimulus were shown together, response 
time was faster on congruent trials where the irrelevant stimulus would have produced the same 
response as the target than on incongruent trials. Although response time was not measured in 
the current research, faster responses in counting the target lines could have allowed easier 
switching between the audio and line tasks, and therefore improved performance. Post-hoc, this 
explanation is not surprising, but questions remain surrounding the classification of resource 
dependency for frames of reference. The contrast between Experiments 1 and 2 perhaps implies 
some trade-off occurring between resources and similarity-based cooperation where increased 
difficulty results in tipping the balance from a congruent resource competition cost to a 
congruent cooperative processing benefit. 
Based on the shared processing routines hypothesis, better performance would be 
expected on the egocentric congruent trials as compared to the allocentric congruent trials. The 
allocentric line task required judgements of right and left of an external space, and the audio cues 
required a judgement of north/south/east/west, which are two different rules. In contrast, the 
egocentric line and audio tasks required considering the position of shapes and lines respectively 
in relation to your right or left, which creates more similarity in the rules of these tasks as 
compared to the allocentric tasks, and hence should lend itself to better dual task performance. 
However, this was not the case, as performance was marginally better in the allocentric 
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congruent condition than the egocentric congruent condition. Importantly, though, even if the 
results did fully align with the shared processing routines hypothesis, they still do not provide an 
answer to how frames of reference are classified under the MRM. Although making spatial 
judgements must use spatial cognitive resources in some capacity, the current results do not 
suggest that the different frames of reference themselves could be classified as depending upon 
the same or different resources within the spatial resource of the MRM.  
 Whether frames of reference use different resources or not, there is a missing piece of the 
MRM. One of the reasons it has been so widely accepted and is so useful in many applied 
situations is due to its ability to predict the outcome of dual task scenarios. However, in this case, 
it did not predict the outcomes and cannot on its own account for them post-hoc. It does not 
appear that frames of reference should be considered a new set of resources and added into the 
model in spite of the support from neuro-physiological evidence, but rather, the question remains 
as to why the MRM cannot be successfully applied in this paradigm under high workload.  
 Another consideration surrounding the conflicting results is that frames of reference are 
not dichotomous and may not be able to be divided into resource groups. Egocentric and 
allocentric frames of reference fall along a continuum, which may explain part of why there is 
not a clear answer to the neural correlates or resource use of frames of reference. The current 
research attempted to investigate frames of reference in pure forms, or at the most extreme ends 
of the continuum, but it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that these tasks only depended 
on one frame of reference or the other. Even if the current tasks were able to use purely 
egocentric and allocentric frames of reference, the inherent overlap between the two may make 
categorizing them into two different cognitive resources practically impossible. While this 
should suggest that they are the same resource, the improvement of performance in congruent 
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conditions do not support this conclusion either. While the MRM cannot currently account for 
frames of reference, it should not ignore them. The lack of clarity of explanation for the results 
from both the MRM and the shared processing routines hypothesis suggest that something is 
different about frames of reference that cannot be explained by current models.  
Speculative Potential Explanations of the Current Findings 
 It was hypothesized that performance on tasks involving color judgements would be 
better than the congruent conditions, and similar in performance to the incongruent conditions. 
However, overall performance in the control conditions was no different than in either the 
congruent or incongruent conditions except in the allocentric incongruent condition of 
Experiment 1. This was surprising because color judgements, a non-spatial task, should have 
used different resources than frame of reference judgements. Under the MRM, spatial resources 
are clearly needed to make frame of reference judgements. The other processing code is verbal, 
also considered categorical or symbolic (Wickens, 2002; see Figure 6), which these color 
judgements and auditory cues could fall under, thereby causing some interference. However, the 
exact mapping of the color judgements is not clear. If we look outside of the MRM, Baddeley’s 
(1992) working memory model may provide some guidance. It defines visuospatial working 
memory as one grouping, which could encompass both frame of reference and color judgements. 
This may explain the similar performance, but still does not clarify where color judgments would 
map to in the MRM. 
 
 




Figure 6. The Multiple Resource Model (adapted from Wickens, 2002). Bolded and highlighted 
are the codes of processing assumed to be relevant to the current experiments. 
 
Comparisons between control and experimental trials in Experiment 1 indicated that 
incongruent resources for allocentric audio tasks improved performance because there was a cost 
of using the same resource, but the same comparison in Experiment 2 suggested that there is an 
actual benefit of using the same resource for allocentric audio performance. The main effects of 
line and audio type on accuracy in Experiment 1 suggest that allocentric congruent conditions 
would be the most difficult, which may be why there was a cost of congruent performance, 
whereas that was not true in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, main effects indicated that 
allocentric audio was more difficult than egocentric, but there was no difference in line type. The 
benefit of the same frame of reference, even with a more difficult task, indicates that this time-
sharing benefit of congruent frames of reference is strong enough to outweigh the difficulty 
difference.   
Another potential explanation could be that the current experiments are actually 
measuring working memory. Participants must hold the location of shapes, the rule for counting 
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lines, the mental count of lines, and the final answer to the audio cue in their mind at once. There 
is clearly working memory involved, however, the audio cues require visual working memory 
and the line task requires verbal working memory. If the current paradigm was testing working 
memory, accuracy would likely have been similar across all conditions because they all used 
spatial and verbal working memory. This was not the case, but even if the difference in results is 
due to spatial working memory interference, it still does not align with the MRM. Spatial 
cognition is a specified resource in the model and frames of reference would likely be considered 
breaking the resource into smaller components, much like the dichotomy of focal and ambient 
vision. Therefore, frames of reference would still be expected to follow the predictions of the 
MRM and show improved incongruent (for different resources) or similar congruent-incongruent 
(for same resource) performance.  
Conclusions  
 Considering frames of reference in the framework of the MRM indicates that some part 
of the MRM is missing or needs to be updated to account for the current findings. It does not 
seem that frames of reference fit in the model as either one or separate resources. Critically, the 
findings here illustrate that the current form of the MRM cannot account for the relative 
efficiency of all multitasking situations. Improved performance on congruent tasks in 
Experiment 2 might be explained by an alternative account, such as a shared processing routines 
hypothesis, although the contrast in outcomes between Experiments 1 and 2 are less obvious 
from such explanations. More research is needed to determine which situations fall into that 
category and the similarities between them before updating the model or creating a new theory. 
 Although the current research suggests that the MRM may be missing a component, this 
is not to say that the MRM is useless, nor incorrect. In its current form, the MRM has been 
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widely accepted and is useful in many situations. It has strongly contributed to human factors 
research, improved human performance, and has stood up to many tests of its current resource 
pools. Nonetheless, understanding its limitations is important for its real-world application. The 
current research is only a starting point of exploring the interactions of task switching, 
multitasking, cognitive resources, and frames of reference.  
Implications 
Improved performance in high workload congruent conditions has a multitude of 
implications for theory and applied settings. These results support the benefits of task similarity 
in a setting that has not yet been explored. While research has explored the benefits of each 
frame of reference independently, the direct, controlled comparison of the two provides a base 
for future applied research with a theoretical background. Specifically, one of the main uses for 
both frames of reference is in navigation. Navigation aids are often used in high workload 
situations, as the environment is unfamiliar. Based on the results of Experiment 2, where using 
the same frame of reference improved performance, it is recommended that if navigation aids 
provide two sources of directions, they should be in the same frame of reference to enhance 
comprehension and usability. This is especially useful in situations such as combining tactile and 
visual navigation cues. Tactile cues are inherently egocentric, so providing tactile cues and a 
visual track-up map could improve performance, which has been shown to be true in at least one 
study (Elliot et al., 2010).  
 Each frame of reference has benefits and drawbacks that are generally resolved by the 
other frame of reference. One way to improve the use of frames of reference in navigation 
scenarios would be to combine the two in a navigation aid, however, it seems that this may only 
be beneficial in low workload scenarios. Although redundant navigation information does not 
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address the drawbacks of the specific frames of reference, it may be helpful in reducing errors 
and increasing comprehension of the task at hand.  
Limitations  
 The current study was conducted with basic stimuli and tasks without a real-world 
counterpart. While this creates a controlled environment to examine underlying cognitive 
mechanisms, other variables and factors from real world navigation settings can impact 
performance and should be investigated. Importantly, the current research did not include single 
task difficulty measures for either tasks so the impacts of the difficulty of each task cannot be 
directly investigated. Future work must include these measures. 
 Additionally, both experiments were conducted entirely online and had a high number of 
participants who began the study but did not finish. This self-selection bias likely reduced the 
number of participants who performed badly on the task. However, in consideration of the strong 
correlation between congruent and incongruent trial performance, this likely only inflated the 
accuracy of the trials and not the trends between trial types. While the research would benefit 
from in-person replication, it is likely that the general results would stand.  
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